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Abstract: The Shibboleth middleware from Internet2 provides a way for users at higher-education institutions to
access remote electronic content in compliance with the inter-institutional license agreements that govern such ac-
cess. To protect end-user privacy, Shibboleth permits users to construct attribute release policies that control what
user credentials a given content provider can obtain. However, Shibboleth leaves unspecified how to construct these
policies.
To be effective, a solution needs to accommodate the typical nature of a university: a set of decentralized fiefdoms.
This need argues for a public-key infrastructure (PKI) approach—since public-key cryptography does not require
parties to agree on a secret beforehand, and parties distributed throughout the institution are unlikely to agree on
anything. However, this need also argues against the strict hierarchical structure of traditional PKI—policy in different
fiefdoms will be decided differently, and originate within the fiefdom, rather than from an overall root.
This paper presents our design and prototype of a system that uses the decentralized public-key framework of SPKI/SDSI
to solve this problem.
1 Introduction
In this wired age, one might think of delivery of licensed Web content as a relation between two entities: the individual
requesting the content, and the server providing that content. Whether the server provides that content to that individual
depends on what deal they arrange.
However, in educational settings, many aspects of this transaction occur at the level of the institution, not of the
individual. The higher education institute (HEI) negotiates (and often pays for) access to licensed material from
a given content provider; whether an individual user can access this material depends on their relation to the HEI.
Furthermore, it should come as no surprise that most HEIs are neither monolithic nor particularly centralized—the
university fragments into schools and departments; and typically each increasingly local unit runs things differently
from its peer units.
To address the basic problem of content delivery to users at HEIs, Internet2/MACE (with support from IBM) developed
the Shibboleth system. Working within Web infrastructure and legacy authentication systems, Shibboleth permits
content providers to learn, via the requesting user’s HEI, whether the user has the necessary credentials to see that
content.
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Educational institutions value privacy, and Shibboleth respects that by hiding the user’s identity from the content
provider, and by letting users have attribute release policies that control what credentials get released to what content
providers. However, the basic system does not address how HEIs, with their Byzantine fiefdoms, can create, maintain,
and resolve these attribute release policies. For any given user, many parties may need to participate, following that
user’s local organization structure; but for two different users, these structures may differ.
This paper reports our use of SPKI/SDSI to design and prototype a system—SPADE—that solves this problem with
Shibboleth. The existence of multiple distributed parties suggests the use of PKI; decentralization and the focus on
authorization suggest the use of the SPKI/SDSI PKI framework. The egalitarian nature of SPKI/SDSI allows the
system to model the natural hierarchy of the HEI. This also provides a datapoint for two sparsely populated spaces:
PKI that does not focus on identity, and PKI that does not focus on the standard X.509 format.
Section 2 presents the the basic Shibboleth system. Section 3 presents the attribute release policy problem. Section 4
presents the SPKI/SDSI framework. Section 5 and Section 6 then present our system. Section 7 reviews related work,
and Section 8 suggests some avenues for future work.
2 Shibboleth Background
At its essence, education focuses on the sharing of information. In this information age, HEIs naturally have moved
towards sharing information via the electronic medium of the Web; where appropriate, institutions would like to share
material to students and staff at other institutions.
A standard framework would make it easier to share information—furthering the goals of education—by freeing each
pair of institutions from having to develop their own scheme. Considering the scenario of a user Alice at institution
IA requesting some content from institution IB leads to some design requirements:
• Institution IB needs to know whether Alice is authorized to see the information, according to the agreement
between IB and IA.
• Institution IA probably already has its own system of authenticating whether a user is Alice; the framework
should use that.
• Institution IB does not need to know Alice’s identity, but just whether she’s authorized; institution IA would
probably rather not reveal Alice’s identity to IB .
• We can’t expect Alice to use anything more than the desktop tools already common at IA—e.g., a Web browser,
and possibly an IA-specific authentication tool, such as Sidecar [28].
• Similarly, we would like the added infrastructure for IA and IB to be only a small delta from their current
infrastructure, and to conform with standards.
Shibboleth [13] provides such a framework. Shibboleth is a federated administrated system that supports inter-
institutional authentication and authorization for sharing of resources, available to users from those institutions. As a
“middleware architecture,” Shibboleth seeks to accommodate the different security systems existing in organizations
and college campuses today. Shibboleth promotes interoperability by using standards, such as SAML and documented
methods of information exchange; it assumes that users employ standard Web browsers to access these resources.
Shibboleth places a great importance on user privacy: the content provider only knows an opaque, session-specific
handle for Alice, not her name.
Components and Terminology To continue with the above usage scenario, suppose user Alice at institution IA (the
origin site) requests resource R from institution IB (the target site). Figure 1 shows this situation. Institution IA has
some legacy way to determine who Alice is. Institution IB needs to decide whether to send resource R back to Alice.
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Figure 1: A basic usage scenario (without Shibboleth)
Shibboleth addresses this problem by adding additional authorization infrastructure at both sides, that exchange some
additional messages. Figure 2 shows this situation.
First, Shibboleth permits the target site to learn an opaque handle to use when asking the origin site about that user.
• Alice’s request for R lands at the Shibboleth Indexical Reference Establisher (SHIRE) at IB (message M1 in
Figure 2).
• The SHIRE is usually a Web server, and redirects the user’s request to the Where Are You From (WAYF) module
(message M2).
• The WAYF module—usually a part of the target site—interacts with the user and asks her where she is from.
(The user usually has to select from a drop-down menu. In this way, the WAYF can also control which institu-
tions have access to the target site.)
• The WAYF stores the mapping between the user’s origin site and the URL of the user’s Handle Service (HS), an
origin-side component that ensures the user has authenticated within IA and that creates pseudonymous handles
for users.
• Once the WAYF determines Alice’s HS, it asks the HS for her handle (message M3).
• The HS responds by returning the handle to SHIRE at the target site (message M4).
Shibboleth then permits the target site to ask the origin site if the user with this handle has the necessary credentials
for this resource.
• In Shibboleth, these credentials are termed attributes; Shibboleth provides for one or more Attribute Authorities
(AA) at the origin site. (This overlap with X.509 “attribute” terminology is unfortunate.) As part of the message
M4, the HS also tells the SHIRE the URL of the AA to use for this user.
• At the target site, SHIRE passes the handle, request, and AA URL to the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR)
(message M5 in Figure 2).
• SHAR contacts the user’s AA and asks for this user’s attributes, in an Attribute Query Message (AQM) (message
M6 in Figure 2).
• The AA retrieves the relevant attributes and returns them to the SHAR in an Attribute Response Message (ARM)
(message M7).
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Figure 2: The basic usage scenario, with Shibboleth
• After the SHAR receives the user’s attributes from the AA, it sends them to the Resource Manager (RM) for
the resource R (message M8 in Figure 2). The RM may have its own Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) which
decides whether the user will be granted or denied access to the resource based on the attributes presented.
Shibboleth uses the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) for the AQM and ARM.
3 The Attribute Problem
Attributes User attributes are the basis for how the target site makes its authorization decisions. In Shibboleth,
attributes are usually name/value pairs relevant to the user, such as:
• Role=Physics Student
• Name=Jane Smith
• Email=jane.smith@college.edu
Shibboleth also provides for hidden attributes relevant to the origin and target site, but not necessarily to the user. For
example, Dartmouth College may have a contractual agreement with the Smithsonian Institute that allows Dartmouth
users to access it; thus Dartmouth must provide additional information, such as a contract number.
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SHAR: http://www.wisc.edu
URL: http://www.wisc.edu/*
ATTRIBUTES: Role=’Student’, Name=’John Doe’
Figure 3: Example of Shibboleth Wildcarded ARP
Attribute Release Policies. Shibboleth places a large emphasis on user privacy. However, Shibboleth target sites
are greedy and will try to obtain as many of the user’s attributes as possible. To balance access and privacy, Shibboleth
allows its users a choice in what information gets released about them and to which site. To achieve this balance,
Shibboleth lets each user have an Attribute Release Policy (ARP).
When the SHAR at the target site asks the AA at the origin site for attributes for the user with a specific handle, the
AA retrieves that user’s ARP and only releases attributes consistent with that policy. Shibboleth ARPs consist of a list
of entries, each with three main fields:
1. A destination SHAR name (e.g., SHAR=http://www.mit.edu)
2. A resource URL (e.g., URL=http://www.mit.edu/ai/reconfiguring.jsp)
3. A list of attributes that can be released to this SHAR and URL (if the user has these attributes and the SHAR
wants them)
The SHAR is usually the website where the URL resides and which hosts the resource.
As noted earlier, the origin site might have hidden attributes, such as a contract number, and an institution-specific
ARP to specify when they should be released. Thus, the AA may serve to add additional attribute values into the
Attribute Response Message (or ARM) sent to the SHAR.
Since is not possible for a user and her institution to be able to provide ARPs for every possible target resource on
the Internet, and every SHAR and URL pairing, Shibboleth permits default and wildcarded APRs. Figure 3 shows an
example of of a wildcarded ARP that specifies that the values of the user’s two attributes of Role and Name can be
release to any site that the user accesses at the University of Wisconsin.
The Shibboleth standard requires that the AA must provide users at the origin side a means by which they can specify
their Attribute Release Policies, This is usually done using a GUI such as a web browser and enables the user to control
his own privacy. The downside, of course, is that a user’s choice of ARP may not be proper to be able to grant him
access to a target resource. Due to this problem, it is often preferable for the user to be aware of each site’s attribute
requirements, possibly shown on the interface.
The Problem. Shibboleth defines the basic structure and use of an ARP. However, how the AA retrieves a user’s
ARP is not part of the Shibboleth standard and is left open to interpretation. The user may have a single ARP or
multiple ARPs. They may be dispersed throughout the organization or they may be collected in one place. How the
user’s ARP is retrieved, validated and enforced is left to the implementers. The Shibboleth draft [13] states:
AA implementers are free to support many different kinds of ARPs with varying semantics as long as
the AA can efficiently process requests and determine the effective policy to apply...Shibboleth doesn’t
specify or constrain how an AA can answer these kinds of questions.
In a typical HEI, the lines of administrative control are dispersed—e.g., the user is one place; his our her department
office somewhere else; the college office yet a third place. Furthermore, the structure of this distribution will vary
from user to user. In a typical HEI, it also likely that the decision procedure for attribute release will follow such
administrative lines. This leaves us the questions:
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• How do we build an ARP system that permits, for each user, the ARP to be easily resolved from the components
each of these various parties introduces?
• How do we build an ARP system that enables each such party to easily build their local components?
Section 4 describes the PKI tool we used. Section 5 and Section 6 describe the system we built.
4 SPKI/SDSI: Lightweight Authorization PKI
To solve our distributed trust problem, the AA at the origin site needs to collect policy components created by many
other parties throughout the institution. This task leads to some challenges:
• How does the AA verify the authenticity of these components produces by parties distributed throughout the
institution?
• How does the AA merge these components?
• How does the AA even find these components?
The technology of public-key cryptography is well-suited to the first challenge—since parties distributed throughout
the institution are unlikely to be able to agree on a secret beforehand (nor to agree on anything else, for that matter).
To apply this technology to this problem, we looked at the tools available for public-key infrastructure (PKI): “mech-
anisms for creating, distributing and using public keys” [21]. Typically, the main purpose of PKI is to specify how
names and attributes should be bound to public keys. Usually PKI does this by using a public key certificate: a signed
statement binding something to a public key. Typically, in a PKI, there are two types of certificates: an identity cer-
tificate usually binds a public key to a name; an authorization certificate (or attribute certificate) binds a public key to
something else, and signifies an authorization or privilege that is meaningful to the signer and some set of interpreters.
4.1 X.509
Of the existing PKI tools in use today, X.509 has emerged as the common standard. X.509 uses a certification authority
(CA) to sign public-key certificates for entities in the system. These CAs thus act as trust roots and verify that an entity
(usually a user) is the rightful holder of a particular public key.
An X.509 principal is a user’s (allegedly) globally unique distinguished name (DN). An X.509 certificate thus binds
a user’s DN to a public key to produce an identity certificate. X.509 is based on a hierarchical global namespace;
designated Certification Authorities sign and issue certificates to X.509 users, and sometimes for each other. Trust is
established by examining a chain of certificates from a trusted CA’s key to a user’s public key.
Recently, version 3 of X.509 (X.509v3) has been released. X.509v3 contains support for expressing attributes and
authorization, by permitting additional extension fields for these items. Thus, an X.509v3 certificate may bind a
distinguished name to a public key and a set of attributes.
However, there are a number of problems with X.509 in general, especially with regard to authorization and practical
deployment.
First, by binding a user’s name to a public key and a set of attributes all in one X.509v3 certificate, we immediately
compromise the user’s anonymity: without additional countermeasures, a user cannot prove they have a given attribute
without also revealing her identity (and the rest of her attributes). Moreover, while a user’s name is usually bound to
her public key for long periods of time, attributes are usually bound to a user for short periods. Thus, if a user were to
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want to change her attributes, we would need to revoke and reissue her identity. (This would be similar to re-issuing a
university ID card each time a student added or dropped a class.)
To solve this problem, X.509 introduced a separate attribute certificate (AC). Typically, this certificate binds a subject’s
Distinguished Name to a set of attributes and is presented to the verifier of the subject’s attributes together with the
subject’s X.509 identity certificate. However, this approach incurs the overhead of two X.509 certificates for conveying
a subject’s attributes. Moreover, the principal of both the identity Certificate and the Attribute certificate is a name, but
the entity that creates each certificate is different—thus the system needs to ensure that both creators meant the same
thing by that name.
Another serious issue is the data format. X.509 certificates are expressed in the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)
standard. ASN.1 is not readable by (most) humans, and its complexity makes it difficult to program and work with.
A different complexity arises from the consideration that X.509 gives to the potential multiplicity of CAs. In order to
attempt to characterize the information necessary for a relying party to make a reasonable judgment about trusting a
CA’s assertions, X.509 requires that a CA prepare a Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) that expresses the procedures
and rules that the CA follows. Different CAs can be flexible in specifying their own rules, but the lack of a common
mechanism results in different CAs providing a different level of service and consequently a different trust level.
Moreover, a CA’s CPS is specified in convoluted language with legal jargon that hardly anyone can understand (except
perhaps the CA’s lawyers).
4.2 SPKI/SDSI
For all these reasons, a number of new PKI standards were proposed.
In 1996, Ron Rivest and Butler Lampson at MIT designed the Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [26]
with the main goal of facilitating “the building of secure, scalable, distributed computing systems” [7]. Around the
same time, Carl Ellison proposed the Simple Public Key infrastructure (SPKI) [5] to simplify authorization. In 1998,
these two proposals merged to form SPKI/SDSI.
One of the main goals of SPKI/SDSI is to provide flexible and lightweight authorization—particularly in comparison
to X.509. Moreover, to avoid the ambiguity problems in global names, SPKI/SDSI is centered on public keys—since
a PKI principal always ends up needed to prove knowledge of the private key. SPKI/SDSI is egalitarian: no global
hierarchy or hierarchical infrastructure necessary. Every principal is free to issue certificates to other individuals. This
also leads to scalability. As noted above, SPKI/SDSI is centered on keys, and dispenses with the notion of globally
unique names. A principal is free to use names, but these names are explicitly part of that principal’s local namespace.
SPKI/SDSI works by combining a public key with a set of attributes to form an authorization certificate (in contrast
to its counterpart, the X.509 attribute certificate that binds a distinguished name to a public key). Figure 4 shows this
authorization triangle [12]. SPKI/SDSI authorization certificates list the issuer and subject (both identified via public
keys), a tag field that carries the conveyed authorization, and validity dates.
One of the other main advantages of SPKI/SDSI is its ability to delegate authorization easily. This is done using a
propagate bit in the authorization certificate. If this bit is set, then the subject of this certificate can re-delegate the
permission or attributes he is given. Delegation is transitive; if Alice delegates to Bob (with permission to delegate
further) and Bob delegates to Carol, then in effect Alice has delegated to Carol.
SPKI/SDSI can also create name certificates binding names to public key but they are not required for authorization
decisions. The name is valid only for the local namespace and is used by the principal only for personal identification
SPKI/SDSI name certificates list issuer and subject (both identified via public keys), identifier (the local name), and
validity dates. In SPKI/SDSI, a principal can also create groups by issuing multiple name certificates—one for each
group member—with the same name and different subject keys. The concept of groups can also be used to create roles
for role-based authorization.
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Figure 4: SPKI/SDSI authorization triangle (derived from [12]).
SPKI/SDSI can implement threshold certificates where authorization is a collective decision of k-of-n entities.
In SPKI/SDSI, an authorization flow is a chain of valid certificates—authorization only, or authorization and name—
that specifies an authorization [7]. The trust root of an authorization flow is the first principal in the chain who started
the delegation process. Unlike X.509, this principal does not need to be a distinguished CA.
SPKI/SDSI certificates use S-expressions: “human-readable ASCII representations” [25]. LISP-like S-expressions
make it easy for humans to read a certificate and deduce its meaning, in contrast to X.509 and ASN.1. Parsing
canonical S-expressions can take much less code size that parsing ASN.1 data; in one study [11], S-expression parsing
code takes 8 KB, while ASN.1 parsers take 50KB to 500KB,.
As noted earlier, SPKI/SDSI uses a tag-language to express authorization information through large sets of strings or
S-expressions. Standard libraries may be written to intersect certificate tags and deduce what an authorization chain
authorizes. On the other hand, because of X.509’s generality, each developer is free to define an X.509v3 extension
format and then define how those attributes may be intersected. Thus, each application using X.509 has to write a
separate X.509 chain-processing routine.
In contrast to X.509, SPKI/SDSI emphasizes short-lived certificates, rather than Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
4.3 Choosing a Tool
SPKI/SDSI focuses on authorization, not authentication. In the Shibboleth model, the user is assumed to be already
authenticated when we retrieve the user’s relevant ARPs. However, the focus now is on the user’s ARP and his
authorization with respect to the target site resource. Shibboleth does not specify how the user construct his ARP or
how the origin site resolves it.
A SPKI/SDSI-based PKI can make use of its egalitarian design and authorization-centric approach to allow users and
their HEI to specify roles in which those users can participate in, and then to follow these authorization flows to resolve
the ARPs.
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For all the reasons, SPKI/SDSI seemed a like good fit in this area—although no one had yet examined its use in
Shibboleth. Section 5 and Section 6 describe our exploration.
5 SPADE Design
5.1 Overview
To address the attribute release problem in HEIs, we designed and prototyped SPADE: SPKI/SDSI for Attribute Re-
lease Policies in a Distributed Environment. SPADE logically divides an institution or organization into domains that
correspond to physical or structural divisions, such as project groups or academic departments. Each such domain
contains a group of users, as well as an administrator who distributes and manages trust for that domain.
SPADE uses SPKI/SDSI to establish and manage trust. The main concept behind SPADE is that each party in an
organization uses signed SPKI/SDSI authorization certificates to specify an ARP component (in the tag field). SPADE
then acts as an extension of the Shibboleth Attribute Authority (AA). When standard requests for user attributes
come into the AA, they are redirected to SPADE which contacts the relevant user domain and obtains the user’s ARP
component. This ARP is combined with other ARP component in the organization by obtaining a chain of certificates
from the relevant domains of the organization, starting with the individual domain user and his administrator. The
ARP components (the tag fields in these certificates) are intersected to derive the final ARP. By extending the AA
function in this way, this work does not involve modifying any part of the Shibboleth standard.
5.2 Users and Roles
In a higher education institution, users typically act in roles—e.g., faculty, assistant, or student—within
some organizational unit. In SPADE, we identify subjects by roles bound to their public keys, via a SPKI/SDSI name
certificate created by the administrator of that user’s domain.
In typical settings, what a user does within a role depends not just on that user’s will, but also on local culture and
policy. SPADE needs to reflect this flow by letting a user create their own ARP component, to control what attributes
are released when the user acts in that role, but also by letting organizations establish ARP components that further
constrain what users can do in a given role.
This organization-level restriction can apply before a user ARP component is created. For example, consider the above
three roles, at a hypothetical college. The college may decide that, of these roles, only faculty and assistant
should be allowed to release their credit card number to Shibboleth resources. This organization-level decision should
constrain what a user is actually allowed to do when she creates her ARP in the first place (e.g. a user in the student
role should not be able to create an ARP that allows release of credit card number).
Organization-level restrictions may need to apply dynamically, as well. For example, suppose Alice is faculty, and
chose to allow her credit card number to be released. Two weeks later, her college’s security officer learns of credit
card fraud taking place at hacker.com—but suspects that the college users—including Alice—are not aware of this
fraud. The security officer needs to be able to modify its ARP to prevent any of its users’ credit card numbers from
going to hacker.com. Thus, even though Alice has been allowed to specify that she would like to release her credit
card number to hacker.com, and she has indeed specified that, the security officer’s ARP prevents the attribute from
going through to the site. A week later, the fraud has been detected and taken care of and hacker.com has assured
its users that it is safe to send personal information to the site again. The college now modifies its ARP again to allow
all credit card numbers going to hacker.com to be released once again. In the meantime, whether Alice chooses to
do so or not remains her personal choice.
This example gives only one level of organization; scenarios exist for multiple levels as well.
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5.3 Deriving Policy
SPADE derives attribute release policies by permitting each relevant party to create an authorization certificate ex-
pressing its ARP component as an S-expression in the tag field, and then combining the component policies from a
chain of certificates.
Admin ARP Certificates. We start by considering the input that an administrator (e.g., the “security officer” in the
above scenario) needs to have in creating ARPs.
• The admin needs to express different policy for different subordinate roles.
• For each such role, the admin may wish to confine the attributes such a user may even choose to release to a
given site, when creating their policy. (E.g., above, the admin originally allowed faculty to choose to release
credit card numbers to hacker.com.)
• For each such role, the admin may wish to prevent certain attributes from being released to a given site—even if
that role’s policy permits that. (E.g., above, the admin wanted to temporarily prevent faculty from releasing
credit card numbers to hacker.com.)
• For each such role, the admin may wish to require that attributes specific to some agreement between that college
and some given site be passed on, without bothering the user.
To express this information, the admin creates a SPKI/SDSI certificate whose issuer is the admin’s public key, and
whose subject is this subordinate role. Within the tag field, this certificate may contain three different lists of ARP
entries (e.g., tuples of a SHAR, URL, and attribute list) for that role.
• One list specifies the releasable attributes (rATTRIBUTES), which the user may choose to release when con-
structing his or her own policy.
• Another list specifies plain attributes (ATTRIBUTES), which constrain what that role can release right now.
• The final list specifies hidden attributes (hATTRIBUTES), which should be passed on without bothering the
user.
Since this certificate expresses rights and permissions for a following certificate, its propagate bit is set.
Figure 12 (discussed in further depth later) shows an example of an admin ARP certificate.
The admin can split this specification across multiple certificates: each for the same subject, but whose ARP entries
(for each type of attribute) discuss different SHAR-URL pairs. If the admin partitions the specification into a certificate
for rATTRIBUTES and one of the other two types, we call the former a user template and the latter a filter certificate.
User ARP Certificates. An end-user wants to express what attributes she wishes to release to a given site, when she
is acting in a specific role. To do this, she creates a self-signed SPKI/SDSI certificate (since she is speaking about
herself), that gives a list of ARP entries (tuples of a SHAR, URL, and rATTRIBUTE list). The rATTRIBUTE field
refers to the attributes that the user chooses to release.
Users typically create one ARP cert to handle all their roles. But, as with admin certs, the user can split this specifica-
tion across multiple certificates whose ARP entries discuss different SHAR-URL pairs.
A user’s role is bound to her public key by using the user’s own ARP cert, and the admin’s name certificate which
binds the role name to the user’s public key.
Figure 14 (discussed in further depth later) shows an example of a user ARP certificate.
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Intersection. SPADE provides a tool for users to create user ARP certificates, and for the Shibboleth AA to derive an
ARP for a given user in a given role. Both processes involve standard SPKI/SDSI tag intersection over an authorization
flow of certificates.
When a user creates an ARP certificate for a role, SPADE lets the user select attributes from a list—but this list only
consists of the intersection of the rATTRIBUTE lists in the relevant admin certs.
When dynamically resolving an ARP for a user and role, SPADE first intersects the ATTRIBUTE lists in the relevant
admin certs to derive the list of attributes the admins currently feel permissible, and then intersects that result with the
rATTRIBUTE list in the user cert. SPADE also unions the hATTRIBUTES lists in the relevant admin certs to derive
the list of hidden attributes that admins currently wish to always be released, and unions that with the result of the
above intersection.
Attribute Values. As discussed in Section 3, full Shibboleth attributes consist of a pair of name and value. Our
policies discuss the attribute names only, not the values; we store the full attribute in a database at the user’s domain.
Thus, we preserve confidentiality is even if outside users inspect the policies or certificates.
5.4 Domains
SPADE now has a way to derive policy along SPKI/SDSI authorization flows, but we want these flows to follow the
decentralized organizational lines that arise in real educational institutions.
To do this, SPADE divides an organization into a number of logically separable domains, representing sets of users
within some natural organizational unit—e.g., the “History Department at Dartmouth.” In our initial prototype, we
assume these sets are disjoint, but the system could also work as along as each user-role pair resides in at most one
domain.
SPADE also gives each domain domain controller that retrieves the ARP certificates forming the authorization flow
for a particular user in this domain. The SPADE head controller maintains contact with all the domain controllers in
the HEI’s SPADE infrastructure.
Domain Relationships. SPADE requires that the domains within an HEI be organized as a set of trees.
• Each domain has at most one predecessor and any number of successors.
• Within each tree, a unique source domain has no predecessor.
• A a leaf domain has no successor.
• An intermediate domain has at least one of each.
(We could easily extend from trees to more general directed acyclic graphs.)
Domain organization follows the hierarchical structure of the organization: the predecessor domain is the logical next
higher domain in the organizational hierarchy; the successor domain is the logical next lower domain. For example, for
the “Arts and Science” domain at Dartmouth, the “Dartmouth” domain is its predecessor, and the “History Department”
and “Computer Science Department” are among its successors.
Our ARP authorization flows follow this structure: starting with the source domain; each domain then establishes a
cert that propagates ARP constraints to its successor.
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Administrator Tasks. Each domain contains an administrator and is uniquely identified by its administrator’s public
key.
The administrator is responsible for the following functions:
Establishing User Identity. The administrator obtains the public key of the user (preferably offline) and then binds it
to the user’s name using a SPKI/SDSI Name certificate. (This is solely for the purpose of identifying the owner
of the public key when using our SPADE GUI; is not used in authorization decisions.)
Creating Roles. The administrator creates domain roles and assigns users to them using the SPKI/SDSI mechanism
for creating groups. (Thus, authorization takes place based on the user’s role, in the spirit of Role Based Access
Control—RBAC.)
Creating Admin ARP Certs. The administrator creates SPKI/SDSI Authorization Certificates to constrain the ARPs
that SPADE derives for these roles and any successor domains.
Establishing Inter-domain Trust Relationships. The administrator also manages the trust relationships between his
domain and other domains at the HEI. (This structure is discussed further below.)
A domain’s administrator is responsible for correctly identifying that domain’s predecessor and successors. (In fact,
our prototype uses SPKI/SDSI certificates to express these links.)
User Tasks. Each user within a domain is responsible for creating her Attribute Release Policies for different target
resources in Shibboleth. This is done via a user ARP certificate, as discussed above.
5.5 Putting it All Together
When SPADE-enhanced Shibboleth receives an AQM, it starts with the user’s ARP certificate and traces back the
the flow for that user. After SPADE verifies the signatures and derives the resultant ARP, it retrieves the requested
attributes—if the resultant ARP permits that—and returns them to the Attribute Authority in the usual Shibboleth way,
by embedding in a SAML ARM.
Figure 5 shows the entire process.
1. First, the Shibboleth Attribute Requester (SHAR) at the target site contacts the Attribute Authority (AA) at the
origin site for the relevant user’s attributes. The SHAR passes the AA the user handle, and the SHAR and URL
pair of the target resource that the user wishes to access.
2. The AA resolves the handle into the user name and public key (by using an HEI-issued X.509 Authentication
Certificate from the user’s browser) and passes this information on to the SPADE head controller together with
the SHAR and URL values for which the attribute values were requested.
3. The head controller resolves the domain of the user and contacts the user’s domain controller (DC). The head
controller, in effect, hands off the processing to the user’s DC and waits for the attribute values. In this example,
the user is from the History Department.
Since the user specifies which of his many roles he is acting in when he logs into the system, the DC knows
what role in which the user is acting and retrieves the group cert that matches that role to that user’s public key
The user’s DC obtains the user’s ARP certificate from the domain database. It also obtains the domain adminis-
trator’s filter for the user’s role.
4. The user’s DC, after checking the administrator’s database for the URL of the the predecessor domain, contacts
the predecessor’s DC and requests its administrator’s ARP certificate for this SHAR and URL. In this case, the
“History Department” predecessor domain is the “Arts and Science” Domain.
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Figure 5: Example of SPADE attribute release.
5. The user’s DC then obtains the “Arts and Science” predecessor domain from its database. (In this case, it’s the
“Dartmouth” domain.) The user’s DC retrieves Dartmouth’s Admin ARP for the “History Department” (and
this SHAR and URL). The user’s DC also stops retrieving certificates here because it knows that “Dartmouth”
is this HEI’s source domain.
The user’s DC then intersects the user’s ARP, the “History Department” ARP for that user’s role, the “Arts
and Science” ARP for the “History Department,” and the “Dartmouth” ARP for “Arts and Sciences” to form
the resultant ARP. The values of the attribute names specified in the resultant ARP are pulled from the user’s
database.
6. The user’s DC returns the user’s attribute values to the SPADE head controller.
7. The head controller in turn returns the attributes to the AA.
8. The AA, now using the Shibboleth specification, bundles the attributes into SAML and sends them off to the
SHAR which decides whether or not the user gets access to the target resource.
6 SPADE Prototype
We have prototyped SPADE, and connected it to a Shibboleth test deployment at Dartmouth. As discussed above, our
SPADE prototype acts as an extension of the Shibboleth Attribute Authority (AA).
We have also implemented a web-based GUI that allows the users and domain administrators to log on and manage
their policies. An administrator uses the GUI to authorize new users in the system, create roles to which users may be
assigned, assign those roles, and create admin ARP certs to constrain policies for users and subordinate domains. user
may use the GUI to create and modify her attribute release policy.
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Our prototype uses Java, HTML, and Java Servlets. The code is divided into three main parts:
SPKI/SDSI code. We started with the sdsi Java code developed by the Cryptography and Information Security
Group at MIT [9]. This code is a GUI package designed to familiarize users with SDSI operations such as
creating certificates and deriving authorization decisions from certificate chains.
Starting with this base, we made a number of modifications (adding approximately 1250 lines of code). As
part of this work, we stripped away the GUI code and adding helper functions in relevant classes. We also
implemented a library to intersect SPKI/SDSI certificate tags, based on the SPKI/SDSI standard [5]. This library
processes normal as well as special S-expressions such as the wildcarded (*), (* range), (* prefix)
and (* set) formats. We also wrote helper files to process SPADE-relevant operations quickly, such as
obtaining the names of all roles in a domain by resolving its authorization certificates and name certificates.
Java Servlet code. The bulk of SPADE is our approximately 4000 lines of Java servlet code. This component plugs
into the SPKI/SDSI code to create objects such as public keys, name certificates, and authorization certificates
and to verify certificate chains. It handles the web-based GUI: building dynamic web pages, processing user
input and interacting with the prototype databases (which are actually file system directory hierarchies).
HTML code. SPADE also contains a small amount of HTML code to call and process servlets.
In our experimental setup, the entire code package and directory hierarchy (approximately 5500 lines of code) sits on a
server, where it is plugged into a Shibboleth test club implementation (Shibboleth v 0.8). The current code is available
for download at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/˜nazareth/thesis/
Figure 6 through Figure 14 show some examples from our prototype.
For a domain administrator, one of the first tasks might be defining the roles in that domain, and assigning users to
roles. Figure 6 shows the GUI for an admin to create SPKI/SDSI groups and add users. Figure 7 shows an example
group certificate indicating group measurement, for a user principal expressed as a public key; for convenience to the
administrator, Figure 8 shows an example name certificate binding a local name to this public key.
Discussing an attribute release policy requires working with SHAR-URL pairings, since Shibboleth organizes ARP
entries by these pairings. Figure 9 shows the GUI to create these pairings. With roles and SHAR-URL pairings
established, Figure 10 then shows the GUI the administrator can use to specify the various admin ARP certificate
components. The admin can include hidden attributes in the ARP certificate which he or she can choose to tell the
user about. Figure 11 then shows the GUI that summarizes the policy, and lets the administrator actually create the
certificate. Figure 12 shows an example of the resulting certificate.
On the user end, Figure 13 shows the GUI that lets the user construct a user ARP certificate; the user can select a role,
and then, for the SHAR-URL pairings, can select the attributes (from the choice given by the admin certificates) the
attributes she wishes to release. Figure 14 shows an example of the resulting certificate.
7 Related Work
Shibboleth uses attribute release policy to protect user privacy; SPADE uses SPKI/SDSI to provide a decentralized
way to manage them. In this section, we quickly review some other principal work in this general area.
The Open Profiling Standard (OPS) [17, 18] employs a “personal profile” to let Web users specify what attributes they
wish to release. Unlike Shibboleth (which it preceded), OPS allows the content provider to write a user’s profile, and
requires modifications to the client browser.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) project [8] provides an XML-based way for content providers (and other
Web entities) to describe their data collection practices, so that users can make informed privacy judgments before
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Figure 6: The SPADE GUI that let the domain administrator create and manage roles.
(cert
(issuer
(name
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AMh8A5+uINnrESIHlW2Gk1Uf4kthKnWnjNyg8wXNJXPaEXax/DPTNTMDuUC
ZRVyFGohuqr87VAR4ZFU99OkIWeryPwKsXjwyHr7Bq1K61+n0HByRNhZkBFj
qajpreByRw9V+fwV9O8WPIVkMvIgTpcMF6rCKfU3f5M2OROpJ1ZVZ|)))
CS104S03))
(subject
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AKIZRHmb9tOljedSUwph3JxK79OzEEuPlZmmEToqhUratcj6pp9TzL07NGWUT
XTKdFT559lM8QU0P6t3FV/uyIO3MTZJrFcUaiqs1I9IiwFpI5KyJisURaDzsf6
uC+luix+lHWTpI2+x6rwy6FxUuRrWKxyAmQ0uI38JvJSMcJrd|))))
(valid
(not-before "2003-01-01_00:00:00")
(not-after "2004-01-01_00:00:00")))
Figure 7: SPADE might use a SPKI/SDSI group certificate like this to indicate that the domain matching first public
key says that the user matching the second public key can act in the CS104S03 role.
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(cert
(issuer
(name
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AMh8A5+uINnrESIHlW2Gk1Uf4kthKnWnjNyg8wXNJXPaEXax/DPTNTMDuUC
ZRVyFGohuqr87VAR4ZFU99OkIWeryPwKsXjwyHr7Bq1K61+n0HByRNhZkBFj
qajpreByRw9V+fwV9O8WPIVkMvIgTpcMF6rCKfU3f5M2OROpJ1ZVZ|)))
Alice))
(subject
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AKIZRHmb9tOljedSUwph3JxK79OzEEuPlZmmEToqhUratcj6pp9TzL07NGWUT
XTKdFT559lM8QU0P6t3FV/uyIO3MTZJrFcUaiqs1I9IiwFpI5KyJisURaDzsf6
uC+luix+lHWTpI2+x6rwy6FxUuRrWKxyAmQ0uI38JvJSMcJrd|))))
(valid
(not-before "2003-01-01_00:00:00")
(not-after "2004-01-01_00:00:00")))
Figure 8: SPADE might use a SPKI/SDSI name certificate like this to indicate that the domain matching first public
key says that the user matching the second public key has local name “Alice.”
Figure 9: The SPADE GUI that enables creation of SHAR-URL pairings, to be used in ARP certificate construction.
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Figure 10: The SPADE GUI that lets the domain administrator construct entries for an admin ARP certificate.
Figure 11: The SPADE GUI that summarizes the policy an a domain administrator has created, and lets them go ahead
and create the actual certificate.
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(cert
(issuer
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AMh8A5+uINnrESIHlW2Gk1Uf4kthKnWnjNyg8wXNJXPaEXax/DPTNTMDuUCZR
VyFGohuqr87VAR4ZFU99OkIWeryPwKsXjwyHr7Bq1K61+n0HByRNhZkBFjqajp
reByRw9V+fwV9O8WPIVkMvIgTpcMF6rCKfU3f5M2OROpJ1ZVZ|))))
(subject
(name
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AMh8A5+uINnrESIHlW2Gk1Uf4kthKnWnjNyg8wXNJXPaEXax/DPTNTMDuUC
ZRVyFGohuqr87VAR4ZFU99OkIWeryPwKsXjwyHr7Bq1K61+n0HByRNhZkBFj
qajpreByRw9V+fwV9O8WPIVkMvIgTpcMF6rCKfU3f5M2OROpJ1ZVZ|)))
CS104S03))
(propagate)
(tag
(adminARP
(ROLE
(CS104S03)
(SHAR
(http://www.dartmouth.edu)
(URL
(http://www.dartmouth.edu/cs)
(rATTRIBUTES (CreditCardNo DOB Email)
(hATTRIBUTES (contract_number)
(ATTRIBUTES (DOB Email)))))))))
(valid
(not-before "2003-01-01_00:00:00")
(not-after "2004-01-01_00:00:00")))
Figure 12: This example SPADE admin ARP certificate shows the attributes a CS104S03 user can choose to put in
her ARP (rATTRIBUTES), can currently release (ATTRIBUTES), and the hidden attributes (hATTRIBUTES) that
are released without bothering the user.
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Figure 13: The SPADE GUI that enables the user to create a user ARP certificate for a role, based on the constraints
established by the administrators above her. (In this case, the releasable attributes are the same for each SHA-URL
pair.)
(cert
(issuer
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AKIZRHmb9tOljedSUwph3JxK79OzEEuPlZmmEToqhUratcj6pp9TzL07NGWUT
XTKdFT559lM8QU0P6t3FV/uyIO3MTZJrFcUaiqs1I9IiwFpI5KyJisURaDzsf6
uC+luix+lHWTpI2+x6rwy6FxUuRrWKxyAmQ0uI38JvJSMcJrd|))))
(subject
(public-key
(rsa-pkcs1-md5
(e #010001#)
(n
|AKIZRHmb9tOljedSUwph3JxK79OzEEuPlZmmEToqhUratcj6pp9TzL07NGWUT
XTKdFT559lM8QU0P6t3FV/uyIO3MTZJrFcUaiqs1I9IiwFpI5KyJisURaDzsf6
uC+luix+lHWTpI2+x6rwy6FxUuRrWKxyAmQ0uI38JvJSMcJrd|))))
(propagate)
(tag
(userARP
(ROLE
(CS104S03)
(SHAR
(http://www.dartmouth.edu)
(URL
(http://www.dartmouth.edu/cs)
(rATTRIBUTES (CreditCardNo)))))))
(valid
(not-before "2003-01-01_00:00:00")
(not-after "2004-01-01_00:00:00")))
Figure 14: This example SPADE user ARP certificate shows that the user with this public key permits her
CreditCardNo to be released to this SHAR-URL pair, when she acts in the role of CS104S03.
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interacting. Users must use a browser that is aware of P3P policy; candidates include Microsoft’s IE (version 6 and
later) [23] as well as the Privacy Bird plug-in (www.privacybird.com).
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [14] is an XML-based language for expressing a user’s
security policies and involves authorization for resources. XACML supports fine-grained authorization control and
RBAC. However, XACML is only a language for specifying policies and how to combine them to deduce autho-
rization. XACML does not define a policy-based infrastructure, nor does it cover policy dissemination, retrieval,
enforcement and administration. Although it is not part of the Shibboleth specification, XACML could be used to
specify a Shibboleth ARP. (Subsequent to our SPADE work, Lorch et al [22] have briefly explored the XACML ap-
proach as part of a large exploration of XACML-based access control, the “inherent semantic complexity” contrasts
with the simpler SPADE approach.)
Like XACML, the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [15] is another XML-based OASIS initiative. SAML
provides a way to exchange information about user authentication, authorization and attributes between online sites.
Unlike XACML, SAML makes no effort at privacy or policy specification. As we have discussed, SAML is used in
Shibboleth to carry user attributes between the origin site and the target site.
IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [27] is an XML-based model for “enterprise-internal pri-
vacy policies.” However, unlike Shibboleth and SPADE, EPAL does not permit end subjects to manipulate policy.
The work of Blaze et al [4, 2] defined trust management as “a unified approach to specifying and interpreting security
policies, credentials, and relationships that allows direct authorization of security-critical actions.” Trust management
systems handle security policies, authentication as well as authorization. An integral and central part of a Trust
Management system is the compliance checker. A request, a policy and a set of credentials (usually a public key
certificate) are input to compliance checker which answers “yes” “no”, depending on whether the credentials and
request complies with the policy. PolicyMaker [2] and KeyNote [3] are two examples of Trust Management systems.
PolicyMaker expresses authorization policies and trust deference policies through assertions in a “safe” language;
KeyNote was designed according to the same principles as PolicyMaker, using credentials that directly authorize based
on a public key. Two additional design goals for KeyNote were standardization and aiding the ease of integration into
applications.
The Distributed Trust Management System at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County [20] uses rights and
delegations with certificates to create a trust management system. This infrastructure uses X.509 certificates and
Prolog policies to enforce security. (SPADE, which uses SPKI/SDSI, possesses many of the properties of a Distributed
Trust Management system such as delegation and authorization.)
IBM’s Trust Establishment Framework (TEF) [19] maps the subject of a certificate to a role, based on the certificate
and policy. Like SPADE, the IBM TEF supports decentralized trust structures “mirroring the real world.” TEF uses
X.509 Attribute Certificates, and uses an XML-based trust policy language.
Chadwick’s Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI) [6] looks at authorization in the same hierarchical spirit as
X.509 identity: “a PMI is to authorization what a PKI is to authentication.” His PERMIS system is the primary
example of an X.509-based PMI (although PERMIS also authenticates and thus could be also be considered a Trust
Management System). SPADE can be thought of as a SPKI/SDSI PMI—using SPKI/SDSI authorization certificates
instead of X.509 attribute certificates. Like PERMIS, SPADE embeds the policy in the certificate. However, unlike
PERMIS, we use S-expressions and the standard SPKI/SDSI tags instead of an XML-based policy.
PolicyMaker, KeyNote and PERMIS are trust management systems that include a policy model. In contrast, Pon-
der [10] and the Simple Policy Control Protocol (SPOCP) [16] are policy models without a trust management system.
Ponder is an object-oriented language that can specify both security policies and management policies. SPOCP can be
thought of as a policy engine that tests if an authorization request from a client ought to be allowed or not, given a set
of policies. SPOCP uses S-expressions to specify queries and policies.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
The principal goal of SPADE is to show the viability and effectiveness of using SPKI/SDSI as a basis for a distributed
trust system for specifying and conveying policies for digital libraries—particularly in institutes of higher education
where separate fiefdoms make public key technology preferable to shared secrets or central servers, but where disparate
local hierarchy makes traditional PKI in appropriate.
SPADE uses SPKI/SDSI certificates to delegate authority and to manage policies in an organization. SPADE allows
user to define and create their own ARPs, specific to their organizational assigned role in that Domain. SPADE allows
other Domains in the organization to exert their influence on the individual user’s ARP and to thus base the final ARP
on the intersecion of these ARPs.
As a sociologist colleague observed [1]:
SPADE is able to capture the necessary features of most of modern organization (hierarchical structure)
and the benefits of hierarchy, without also capturing the costs/negative aspects of hierarchy. This is very
cool
Future work includes trying the system in pilot populations, as well as extending this approach to decentralized trust
management to other arenas in Shibboleth (such as attribute acceptance policies, at the content provider) and else-
where. The issues of the ”timeliness” or ”freshness” of SPKI/SDSI certs must also be researched in more detail.
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